Drones are generally classified based on distinct characteristics, such as function, size, payload, geographical range, flight endurance, and altitude[6]. According to the NATO classification, the drone dynamics in Ukraine have showcased class I and class III drones, where class I drones are less than 150kg, and class III drones are greater than 600kg[7]. In the war in Ukraine, small military drones – both fixed-wing and rotary, integrated with the ground units – have been commonly used for surveillance, target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and information warfare[8]. 

Class III drones – large surveillance and strike drones – are useful for gathering information over the lengthy periods of time (i.e., between 12-26 hours, with a General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper now achieving up to 40 hours) and can execute remote strikes[9]. However, without air superiority, they are vulnerable to air defences, electronic countermeasures, and are expensive to replace ($5m for one Bayraktar TB2). The large drones did not survive once Russian air defence and electronic warfare systems were properly integrated in Ukraine[10]; while other class III drones (i.e., Russia’s Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone) faced obstacles in providing good quality intelligence due to unreliability of its systems [11].

The Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2One is a vivid example of the large (class III) armed military drones that captured Ukrainian headlines and the public imagination in the first days and weeks of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see Figure 2). It was used for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and tactical strike missions[12]. The acquisition of Bayraktar TB2 drones was presented as a deterrent against Russia’s aggression, and provided just as important as the supply of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles[13]. The TB2s supplemented manned Ukrainian jets and provided the Ukrainian Air Force a ground strike capability that did not endanger its pilots in the critical few days and weeks since the full-scale Russian invasion[14]. They were used as decoys in the mission to sink the missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet[15]. One of the last successful employments of TB2 by Ukrainian forces was seen in the battle to recapture Snake (Zmiinyi) Island in the Black Sea in May and June 2022 where TB2s directly targeted several navy vessels and served as a surveillance and targeting platform in the raid against Chornobaivka airport in Kherson region[16].

The Bayraktar TB2’s low speed (i.e., 130 km/h) and size (i.e., 12m) made it vulnerable on a battlefield with dense anti-air defence systems and electronic warfare at high density[17]. As such, the TB2 disappeared over the skies of Ukraine from September 2023 due to the evolving dynamic of the war[18]. This contrasts with the effective performance of TB2 in Libya, Syria, and during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, conflicts without a dense layer of air defences[19]. Similar scholars from security studies community argue that large drones have limited utility in high-intensity conflicts, and their success depends on the failure of an adversary’s air defence[20].